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Assimilation and Integration of Immigrants in Europe
* 
 
This paper documents assimilation of immigrants in European destinations along cultural, 
civic, and economic dimensions, distinguishing by immigrants’ generation, duration of stay, 
and origin. Based on the European Social Survey, it suggests that assimilation may have 
multiple facets, and take place at different speed depending on the outcome in question. 
While assimilation along some economic and cultural outcomes may be correlated, such 
correlations are not systematic, and imply that progress on some dimensions may 
compensate the lack of progress on other dimensions; and also that a big discrepancy in one 
dimension is not necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. 
Correlation of immigrants’ outcomes and specific policies aimed at immigrants’ integration 
are rather disparate, raising further questions regarding both their effectiveness and 
differentiated effect on various aspects of life. 
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* This paper is an abstract from the conclusion of the book “Cultural Integration in Europe”, edited by 
Yann Algan, Alberto Bisin, Alan Manning and Thierry Verdier, forthcoming in the Oxford University 








While European countries are witnessing an especially vivid debate about immigrants’ 
assimilation and integration into receiving societies, this paper offers a systematic analysis of 
whether such assimilation is indeed taking place. We suggest that, being a complex 
phenomenon, assimilation may be taking place along different dimensions and with different 
speed, and also differ across immigrants of various origins going to various destination 
countries. 
We find that first-generation immigrants differ in a most important way from native-born 
along such dimensions as language, citizenship, civic involvement, religiosity, trust, 
perceived discrimination, occupations, and income. However, these differences are no longer 
the same for second-generation immigrants. In fact, a spectacular progress is observed 
between generations with respect to language and citizenship, occupations and income, 
while features such as religiosity are relatively persistent. In contrast, perceived 
discrimination and unemployment may actually aggravate for second-generation immigrants, 
while trust may also diminish, as compared to native-born and to first-generation immigrants. 
At the same time, we also find that there is an important heterogeneity in these outcomes not 
only across immigrant generations, but also across destination countries and migrant origins. 
Assimilation along cultural and economic outcomes may be related one to another. For 
example, one would expect that learning a language of the receiving country may help 
immigrants to find a better job. We explore the relationship between assimilation along 
different behaviors, but do not find very strong or consistent patterns between them. In fact, 
for first-generation immigrants, we rather observe that progress on some dimensions may 
compensate the lack of progress on other dimensions; and also that a big discrepancy in one 
dimension is not necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. 
Preserving some of the behaviors may actually be of help to immigrants to progress on 
others. 
For second-generation immigrants, we find a particularly strong relationship between 
possessing citizenship and economic outcomes, language and citizenship, language and 
perceived discrimination, as well as between perceived discrimination and trust. Since the 
perceived discrimination reflects immigrants’ experiences with the attitudes and behaviors of 
native-born in the receiving societies, the latter finding suggests that immigrant assimilation is 
interdependent with the attitudes and acceptance of immigrants on the part of the native-
born. 
Finally, we relate immigrants’ assimilation to integration policies available in the European 
countries. We find that policies favoring labor market access of immigrants are positively 
related to assimilation in terms of employment. However, the link between other policies and 
behaviors is less clear. One of the reasons for this is that migration policies are also very 
complex. The same policy, such as, for example, antidiscrimination, may favor economic 
assimilation in providing more equal opportunities in the labour market; but at the same time, 
these very opportunities of equal treatment may favor the preservation, and not the change, 
of cultural behaviors. If this is the case, this can also partly explain why we observe 
assimilation on some, but not all, dimensions. This fining also opens a debate of what 
constitutes good integration policies, what policies we would like to have, and how to assess 




Modern  European  countries  are  witnessing  an  especially  vivid  political  and  social 
debate about immigrants’ assimilation and integration into receiving societies. Most recently, 
these discourses were particularly vibrant in 2010, when the French Minister of immigration 
and integration lead a country-wide debate on what constitutes national identity; as well as in 
2009-2010  in  France,  Switzerland,  and  Belgium,  with  respect  to  integration  of  religious 
minorities, and wearing a full-face Islamic veil as an affront to the national values. 
A high concern about the failure of integration remains; while the large and growing 
empirical literature has not reached a consensus on this question. One of the reasons for this is 
that for the most part, the literature tends to focus on one specific aspect of assimilation at a 
time, without considering an interplay between the various dimensions of assimilation across 
different spheres of life, and neither considering the role of policies in this process.  
There  is  an  important  body  of  research  on  the  classical  questions  of  immigrants’ 
economic assimilation, such as in terms of wages (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Hu, 2000; 
Algan et al, 2010), occupations (Chiswick, 2002; Green, 1999; Chiswick and Miller, 2009), 
participation to welfare programs (Borjas, 2002; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Riphahn, 2004). 
Numerous papers also look at social and cultural dimensions, such as fertility adjustment 
(Blau, 1991; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), perceived national or ethnic identity of immigrants 
(Dustman, 1996; Bisin et al., 2008; Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann, 2009; Manning 
and Roy, 2010), socialization (De Palo et al, 2007), or citizenship acquisition (Bueker, 2005; 
Chiswick  and  Miller,  2008).  One  observation  that  emerges  from  this  literature  is  that 
assimilation is a very complex phenomenon, and that it may be taking place along some, but 
not all dimensions. For example, it may happen along language improvement, citizenship 
acquisition,  or  employment,  but  not  necessarily  religiosity.  Its  speed  also  varies  greatly 
depending  on  the  outcome  in  question.  Further,  assimilation  may  also  be  heterogeneous 
across destinations, across origin groups, or both. As most of the studies are done on different 
subsamples of immigrants, in different countries, and often using a different methodology, it 
is difficult to reach a conclusion on the overall assimilation. 
While not claiming to provide one-and-for-all evidence on assimilation of immigrants 
in Europe, this paper is trying to fill an existing gap, and its contribution is three-fold. First, 
using the European Social Survey, we offer a comprehensive analysis of assimilation along  
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economic, cultural, and civic outcomes of the same individuals, using the same methodology 
and specifications, and contrasting different immigration waves and immigrant generations in 
Europe.  Wherever  possible,  we  look  at  assimilation  patterns  of  immigrants  from  specific 
origins,  as  heterogeneity  of  origins  countries  plays  an  important  role  in  the  assimilation 
processes. Also, the comparative analysis is performed across numerous European countries 
that  differ  in  their  migration  histories  and  migration  policies,  all  of  which  also  has 
implications for immigrants’ adjustment processes.  
Second, we explore a potential relationship between these assimilation processes. For 
example, the progress in mastering the language of the country of residence may be important 
in its own right, but it also affects the speed of assimilation along other dimensions (Chiswick, 
1991;  Dustman,  1994).  The  interest  is  hence  to  assess  the  degree  of  interplay  between 
assimilation along other cultural and economic outcomes.  
Finally, we also look at the link between assimilation and integration opportunities 
offered by the receiving societies, the latter being measured in terms of the immigrant-specific 
institutions and policies in the destination countries. To this end, we employ the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is a cross-country index of six main policy areas of 
the integration of immigrants: “anti-discrimination”, “access to nationality”, “family reunion”, 
“political participation”, “labor market access”, and “long-term residence”.  
Throughout the paper, we are careful in distinguishing the notions of “assimilation” 
and “integration”. Immigrant assimilation – a process of convergence of immigrant behavioral 
and  preferential  outcomes  to  the  outcomes  of  the  native-born  –  is  mostly  a  one-way, 
absorption, process. It may be rather necessary, and even desirable, for some outcomes, such 
as, for example, possibility to occupy a high-skilled position for immigrants with comparable 
education.  However,  it  is  not  necessarily  advantageous  for  other  outcomes,  where  rather 
integration may be desirable. Integration can be defined as a process of providing immigrants 
with equal chances to access opportunities available to native-born. As such, it reflects the 
extent to which receiving societies are willing to go towards immigrants, accept them, and 
provide them with equal rights to express their behaviors and preferences along with the 
native-born,  while  potentially  preserving  and  fully  expressing  of  their  differences.3 
                                                           
3 To quote the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, 1966: “I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, 
of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will 
turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the  
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Integration is thus most framed by specific measures and policies at the destination country 
that allow – or not - for the inclusion of immigrants into different life dimensions. The interest 
of this chapter is hence to assess to what extent there exist links between opportunities for 
integration provided by receiving societies and the assimilation processes. 
Our  main  findings  are  the  following.  First,  the  differences  in  outcomes  between 
native-born and different types of migrants (by duration and generation) vary substantially 
depending on the outcome in question. For first-generation immigrants, the largest gaps are 
observed in outcomes such as language, citizenship, civic involvement, religiosity, perceived 
discrimination, trust, occupations, and income. The gaps in language and citizenship diminish 
in the most spectacular way between first- and second-generation immigrants; however, in a 
number of countries, second-generation immigrants still have a significantly higher rate of 
non-citizenship as opposed to native-born, a finding that raises concerns regarding the lack of 
opportunities provided by the receiving countries to gain citizenship. The gaps in religiosity 
are more persistent, while the gaps in perceived discrimination and unemployment actually 
widen as we move from first to second generation immigrants in some countries like France. 
Interestingly, we also find that second-generation immigrants distrust significantly more the 
police  then  the  native-born  and  then  the  first-generation  immigrants.  Potentially,  these 
differences in unemployment, discrimination feeling, and trust, go hand in hand. 
Second, we find that there is a large heterogeneity of gaps depending on migrants’ 
origin and destination. For example, for language outcome, more variation is observed across 
the destination countries rather than within the same country of destination between different 
immigrants. In contrast, in terms of probability of having a tertiary degree, more variation is 
observed across origin groups. 
Further, correlations between differences in outcomes among native-born and various 
types of immigrants reveal very few regularities. For first-generation immigrants, the only 
strong  correlations  are  between  the  use  of  destination  country’s  language  and  income; 
occupying  a  high-skilled  job  and  being  religious;  preferences  for  redistribution  and 
unemployment; citizenship and civic outcomes; discrimination and trust. In general, however, 
we do not find very strong correlation patterns between various types of outcomes, contrary to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
stereotyped Englishman… I define integration, therefore, not a flattening process of assimilation but as equal 
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. Quotation borrowed from 
Algan et al (2010).   
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what  might  have  been  expected.  For  example,  there  is  virtually  no  correlation  between 
language and citizenship or trust; citizenship and economic outcomes or discrimination. This 
finding suggests that progress on some dimensions may compensate the lack of progress on 
other  dimensions;  and  also  that  a  big  discrepancy  in  one  dimension  is  not  necessarily  a 
handicap,  or  an  impediment,  for  assimilation  on  other  grounds.  Preserving  some  of  the 
behaviors may actually be of help to immigrants to progress on others.    
For  second-generation  immigrants,  the  patterns  of  interplay  between  cultural  and 
economic  outcomes  are,  for  the  most  part,  different,  and  linked  both  to  the  fact  that 
assimilation is taking place, and also that the composition of two immigrant groups is not the 
same. A particularly high positive correlation is found between differences among native-born 
and  second-generation  immigrants  in  citizenship  and  economic  outcomes,  language  and 
citizenship, language and perceived discrimination, but not between language and economic 
outcomes. Differences in perceived discrimination are positively correlated with differences 
in  citizenship  and  language,  but  also  with  differences  in  trust.  Since  the  perceived 
discrimination reflects immigrants’ experiences with the attitudes and behaviors of native-
born  in  the  receiving  societies,  the  latter  finding  suggests  that  immigrant  assimilation  is 
interdependent with the attitudes and acceptance of immigrants on the part of the native-born. 
Last but not least, we find little correlation between migration policies and differences 
in outcomes. Of notable exception are high correlations between differences in unemployment 
and  policies  favoring  labor  market  access  of  immigrants;  as  well  as  praying  and  anti-
discrimination  policies.  Small  and  unsystematic  correlations  raise  questions  about  the 
effectiveness of such policies. However, we also acknowledge that the same policies may 
have  a  very  complex  impact  on  various  outcomes.  For  example,  better  enforcement  of 
antidiscrimination legislation may favor economic assimilation in providing immigrants with 
more equal opportunities in the labour market; but at the same time, these very opportunities 
of equal treatment may favor the preservation of cultural behaviors, rather than encourage 
convergence of immigrants’ outcomes to the ones of the native-born. The same policy can 
thus enhance assimilation on one dimension and facilitate integration on another ground; and 
if  this  is  the  case,  this  can  partly  explain  why  we  observe  individual  progress  on  one 
dimension, but not the other. By the same token, the same policy can also be more effective in 
one sphere of life, and not the other, and hence the assessment of its effectiveness should be 
done among all possible dimensions.  
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This finding once again stresses how multifaceted assimilation and integration can be, 
and how specific policies may spillover on various life domains. It also leads us to raising a 
question  of  what  actually  constitutes  “good  policies”:  should  “good”  policies  aimed  at 
immigrants’ inclusion change, or, to the contrary, preserve and allow for a free exercising, of 
immigrant outcomes? What should the goals of such policies be? We leave this debate open to 
further research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used for the 
analysis.  Section  3  outlines  the  methodology.  In  Section  4,  we  present  the  results  for 
economic, social, and cultural assimilation of immigrants, while sections 5 and 6 provide the 




To get comparable data for performing cross-country correlations, we use a unified 
database: the cumulative European Social Survey (ESS) from 2001 to 2009. This survey is 
conducted in most of the European countries every two years, and has the value added to 
provide the same variable definition for economic and cultural outcomes across the different 
countries.  The  survey  reports  information  on  different  dimensions  of  immigrants’  life. 
Importantly, the same questions of the survey are asked to all individuals in all participating 
countries, with a particular effort made to ensure the cross-country comparability of questions 
and concepts (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005). The random sampling “on full coverage of 
eligible resident populations” aims at objectivity and equivalence of sampling strategies in all 
participating countries (Jowel et al, various issues). 
Using the ESS, we measure the cultural and civic integration processes with indicators 
of  family  arrangements,  language  spoken  at  home,  religiosity,  socialization,  various 
dimensions  of  trust,  perceived  discrimination,  civic  life  and  citizenship  acquisition.  We 
capture economic integration by using indicators of educational attainment and labor market 
outcomes with the employment, type of occupation, and income penalty.  
The ESS also reports key information on the country of origin and the country of 
destination  of  all  immigrants.  This  information  allows  us  first  to  control  for  country  of  
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residence  fixed  effects  that  could  drive  the  cultural  and  economic  integration  processes. 
Second, the information given by the country of origin fixed effects allows us to control partly 
for the sample composition of immigrants. This is important because if, for instance, if we are 
interested  in  comparing  the  cultural  integration  of  immigrants  of  Maghreb  origin  across 
European  countries,  such  analysis  is  likely  to  be  biased  by  the  fact  that  all  Maghreb 
immigrants do not come from the same country of origin, and the inherited specificities from 
the  home  country  could  determine  the  economic  and  cultural  integration  process  of 
immigrants in their destination country. In addition, the survey contains such key information 
as whether parents were born in the country of current residence, thus allowing to distinguish 
native-born individuals, second and first generation immigrants, as well as individuals with 
one foreign-born parent and information on years of residence.  
Our  analysis  covers  a  large  set  of  Western  European  countries:  Austria,  Belgium, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Unfortunately, data on immigrants 
are not available for Italy.  
Table  1  reports  the  sample  statistics  for  the  percentage  of  native-born  individuals 
(native born with native born parents), second generation immigrants (native born but foreign-
born parents or at least one foreign born parent), and first generation immigrants by duration 
at  destination,  in  the  European  countries  of  the  sample.  In  Table  2b,  we  also  report  the 
percentage of immigrants by country of origin in Europe, all destinations confounded. 
Table  A1  of  Appendix  I  also  provides  descriptive  statistics  for  five  types  of 
individuals:  native-born  individuals,  second-generation  immigrants,  first-generation 
immigrants depending on the duration of their stay, as well as individuals with one foreign-
born parent, aggregated for all European countries of the sample. Those characteristics, for 
which the differences are the largest, are highlighted in italics. As we can see, while some 
differences are observed in socio-economic characteristics, the most pronounced differences 
are  in  cultural  and  civic  outcomes  at  first  sight.  The  next  chapters  explore  further  this 
heterogeneity  in  the  integration  process  of  immigrants  by  controlling  for  the  sampling 
composition of immigrants, their individual characteristics, and the specifics of their country 




We are following the methodology of Algan et al (2010) and Card et al (1998) which 
consists in measuring the gaps between native-born and various sub-groups of immigrants in 
cultural and economic outcomes. Wider gaps are informative of big differences in behaviors, 
while  their  closing  reflects  both  assimilation  and  integration.  In  principle,  for  second-
generation immigrants who are likely to be fluent in host country’s language and completed 
their  schooling  in  the  host  country,  there  should  be  little  differences  in  the  outcomes  as 
compared to native-born. The existence of the gaps may signal the lack of assimilation and 
also integration, especially if gaps in outcomes are accompanied by discrimination. 
To  compute  these  gaps,  we  regress  the  outcomes  of  interest  on  a  set  of  basic 
characteristics, allowing the intercepts for these sub-groups to differ, and running regressions 
individually by these sub-groups. The set of basic characteristics additionally included in each 
regression is comprised of age and gender, destination country (dj) and survey round (rk) fixed 
effects, as well as controls for the type of origin country (om). The latter are categorized into 
six  main  groups
4:  Maghreb  and  Northern  Africa  (MENA),  Africa,  Asia,  South  America, 
OECD, as well as Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia: 
 
Outcomeijmk = Typei + Agei + Genderi + dj + om + rk + eijmk,      (1) 
where Outcomeijmk is an outcome of interest of individual i into country j from country 
m in period k; Typei is one of the following: first-generation immigrants, first-generation 
immigrants with less than 20 years of residence at destination, first-generation immigrants 
with more than 20 years of residence at destination, second-generation immigrants with both 
parents  born  abroad,  or  individuals  who  have  only  one  parent  born  abroad.  While  this 
equation is very parsimonious and relatively simple, it has the advantage of allowing us to 
assess the gaps in various outcomes using exactly the same specification.  
In addition to this, we perform the same regression for first-generation immigrants 
only, separately for each origin, taking all European countries as a unique destination. That is, 
we do the same regressions, where Typeim is now one of the six main origin groups, and 
vector om is omitted: 
                                                           
4 Appendix II provides the list of countries that constitute each origin sub-group.  
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Outcomeimk = Typeim + Agei + Genderi + dj + rk + eimk,       (2) 
Finally, for a subset of ten largest immigrant countries of the sample, which contain at 
least 500 immigrants, we also do similar regressions individually for each origin group and 
destination country pair: 
Outcomeimjk = Typeimj + Agei + Genderi + rk + eimjk,       (3) 
where  Typeim  is  now  one  of  the  six  main  origin  groups  in  a  specific  destination 
country. The next three sub-sections present the results of these regressions.  
It is worthwhile mentioning that, even though we control for the survey round fixed 
effects, this does not allow us to fully control for the cohort effects. Hence, categorization of 
immigrants by duration, and also by belonging to first or second generation, is not free from 
composition concerns. Put differently, the newly arriving immigrants are not similar in their 
characteristics and migration histories to the parents of second-generation immigrants. The 
interpretation  of  our  results  is  framed  by  this  limitation,  as  inter-group  comparisons  are 
informative both of the genuine assimilation patterns and differences due the composition of 
immigration waves.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
  4.1. Cultural integration 
We start by analyzing the various dimensions of cultural outcomes of immigrants. 
These are family arrangements, such as the marital status and the age gap between spouses, 
but  also  the  language  spoken  at  home,  the  frequency  of  praying,  and  the  frequency  of 
socialization. Table 3a reports gaps in these outcomes based on estimating (1) for various sub-
types of immigrants as opposed to the native-born, in all European countries confounded. 
Table 3b further distinguishes gaps for first-generation immigrants from different origins, and 
is based on estimating equation (2).  
From Table 3a, at first sight, there is little difference in probability of being married or 
divorced  among  native-born  and  first-generation  immigrants,  regardless  of  their  time  at 
destination.  In contrast, second-generation immigrants of all origins have lower probability of 
being either married or divorced as opposed to native-born individuals with parents also born  
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in the same country. From Table 3b, differences appear to exist and to be large across origins. 
Among  first-generation  immigrants,  all  but  Africans  and  South-Americans  have  a  higher 
probability of being married, as opposed to native-born. Some of them, notably immigrants 
from  MENA  and  OECD,  but  also  from  South  American  countries,  also  have  a  higher 
probability of being divorced, as opposed to native-born. There is some evidence that first-
generation immigrants,  especially veteran ones, have a lower age gap with their spouses, 
however there is no evidence that these differences are due to particular immigrant origin. 
More  striking  differences  are  observed  for  the  language  outcome.  Language  is 
measured in a dichotomous way, where one is assigned to individuals who report any official 
language of a country as first-mentioned language spoken at home, and zero otherwise (data 
on official country languages come from CIA fact book). This outcome is one of the most 
important  one  for  immigrants,  as  it  also  affects  the  speed  of  assimilation  along  other 
dimensions (Chiswick, 1991, Dustman, 1994).  The  gaps in language spoken at home  are 
significant and initially large for all types of non-native-born individuals regardless of their 
origin. In a notable way, for this outcome, the gaps between any immigrant group and native-
born never vanish, but at the same time, we also observe particularly impressive closing of 
these gaps, the nearer we get to the “native-born with both native-born parents” status. First 
generation immigrants with less than 20 years of residence have a 53.5 percentage points 
higher probability of speaking a different language at home. This  gap  is still statistically 
significant  for  second-generation,  but  the  magnitude  drops  dramatically  to  12  percentage 
points. Figure 1 reports that in all destination countries, second-generation immigrants have 
lower gaps in speaking the language of the country then the first-generation immigrants. 
Figure  2  also  shows  differences  in  language  gaps  by  destination  and  origin  pair, 
suggesting a large variation in outcomes. Not surprisingly, first-generation South-Americans 
in Spain have no language gaps as compared to the native-born, while highest gap is observed 
for Africans in Austria. More generally, immigrants from MENA and Asian countries have 
relatively  high  language  gaps  regardless  of  the  destination.  But  there  is  also  a  large 
heterogeneity  across  the  destination  countries.  Take  the  situation  of  immigrants  from 
Maghreb.  The gap in the probability of speaking a different language at home ranges from 22 
percentage points in France, 42 percentage points in Germany, to 80 percentage points in 
Austria.  By  and  large,  there  is  more  heterogeneity  in  these  gaps  across  the  destination 
counties than within the same country of destination between the different immigrants. We  
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get  these  estimates  by  controlling  for  country  of  origin  fixed  effects.  They  thus  seem  to 
capture genuine specificities in the integration process of each destination country. 
We now turn to religiosity, considered to be perhaps the most persisting cultural trait. 
We measure religiosity as the frequency of praying, relating it to answers to the question 
“Apart when you are at religious services, how often if at all do you pray”.  The answer takes 
on values 1 for every day, 2 for more than once a week, 3 for once a week, 4 for at least once 
a month, 5 for only on special holidays, 6 for less often, and 7 for never; and we convert them 
into days per year. Table 3a first shows a much higher frequency of praying among first 
generation immigrants relative to natives. Table 3b shows that the frequency of praying is 
significantly higher among immigrants from MENA and Africa, and to a lesser extent from 
Asia and South America, relative to native-born. Besides, the gap persists and remains as high 
among  second  generation  immigrants  as  among  first-generation  immigrants,  although 
heterogeneity of changes along this dimension is observed across destinations (Figure 3). 
Lastly, we find some weak evidence that immigrants, especially of first generation, 
have lower propensity of socialization, measured by the question “how often do you take part 
in social activities compared to others of the same age”, and with answers ranging from 1 to 
5; 1 indicating “much less than most”, and 5 indicating “much more than most”. However, 
there is no evidence that immigrants are different from native-born in terms of having a close 
person with whom they can discuss personal matters. 
 
  4.2 Integration in civic life and feeling of discrimination 
In a similar fashion, this section offers additional insight into gaps in civic outcomes, 
such as being naturalized, the probability of being civically involved into various types of 
activities, expressing various types of trust, being satisfied with the way democracy works, 
and having particular preferences for redistribution.  
Becoming a citizen of a destination country can be considered as one of the most 
ultimate – and controversial – outcomes for immigrants. It is framed by the policies of the 
destination countries, as much as by the migration reasons and duration intentions. While 
naturalization means acquiring equal rights of a citizen and thus opening ways to further 
assimilation on many economic, cultural, and civic dimensions, it may also be considered by 
itself as a civic act, a conscious step towards becoming a full member of the hosting society.  
14 
 
As such, it can be viewed as a behavioral civic outcome in its own right. In this chapter, the 
outcome citizen is measured on a zero-one scale, with one standing for having the citizenship 
of the country of current residence. 
Tables  4a  and  4b  show  that  all  types  of  immigrants,  as  well  as  first-generation 
immigrants of all origins have a significantly lower probability to be citizen, as opposed to 
native-born. But as with language, the progress on this dimension is strongly pronounced: 
second-generation  immigrants  regardless  of  the  destination  country  have  a  much  higher 
probability of being citizens in contrast to the first-generation immigrants. At the same time, 
Figure 3 shows that second-generation immigrants are still at a disadvantage as contrasted to 
native-born  in  a  sizeable  number  of  countries.    The  gap  in  naturalization  among  second 
generation immigrants almost vanishes in Great Britain, Netherlands, France, Greece, Ireland 
and Spain and to a lesser extent in Denmark and Sweden. However, it remains statistically 
significant in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, Norway, and to a lesser extent in 
Portugal and Austria. This observation raises particular concerns, as it signifies either a lack 
of assimilation on the part of immigrants along this dimension, or a lack of opportunities 
provided  by  receiving  countries  for  gaining  citizenship  for  second-generation  immigrants 
born in the country; or both. Descriptive statistics of Figure 5 also provided insight into the 
heterogeneity  of  citizenship  acquisition  among  various  countries.  The  lowest  rates  of 
naturalization among first-generation immigrants are observed in Luxembourg and in Spain. 
While in the former country this fact is due to its migration specifics (most immigrants are 
temporary immigrants from other OECD countries), in the latter, this is also partly due to the 
fact that the majority of immigrants have come very recently. If we constrain the sample of 
immigrants to Spain to those with over 20 years of residence, we will see that as many as 72% 
have been naturalized. 
  We further look at the civic participation of immigrants by using a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a respondent reports doing in the last year at least one of the following: being a 
member  or  volunteering  for  a  political  party,  a  trade  union,  or  another  organization  or 
association; taking part in a legal demonstration; signing a petition; or wearing a badge. Table 
4a shows that there is a 13.4 percentage points lower probability to be involved in civic life 
among first generation immigrants. But this gap vanishes quickly. There is no difference in 
these outcomes for first-generation immigrants with a long duration at destination, nor for 
second  generation  immigrants.  Table  4b  shows  that  the  gaps  in  civic  participations  are  
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statistically significant for all country of origins, but higher for immigrants from Asia and 
MENA.  
We turn to various measures of social capital and attitudes, such as trust in others, trust 
in country’s police, parliament, politicians, and in the European parliament. Table 4a shows 
that first generation immigrants tend to be less trusting than the natives, the gap reaching 41.2 
percentage points. Table 4b also shows that this gap is mainly associated with immigrants 
from Africa. It is worth stressing that distrust persists among second generations. The gap is 
still statistically significant and reaches 40.7 percentage points. Figure 6 shows that the gap in 
distrust not only persist but also widens for second-generation immigrants in countries like 
Norway,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  France  and 
Germany.  Also,  Figure  7  shows  the  evolution  of  distrust  in  the  police  among  second-
generation  immigrants,  which  also  raises  particular  concerns  about  the  processes  of 
integration.  Second  generation  immigrants  distrust  significantly  more  the  police  than  the 
native-born and than the first generation immigrants. In contrast, newly arriving immigrants 
tend to have a significantly more positive outlook and trust into the destination country’s 
parliament and politicians, as well as in the European parliament in general, as compared to 
the native-born; reflecting both the self-selection and high hopes associated with migration 
decisions. This positive outlook vanishes quickly, giving place to potential disillusions, as 
signified by the reversal of the trend for second-generation immigrants, when it comes to the 
trust in politicians. In a similar way, satisfaction with democracy is higher among immigrants 
of first generation, but not among second-generation immigrants or individuals with only one 
parent born abroad.   
The  last  line  of  Table  4a  reports  differences  in  preferences  for  redistribution. 
Interestingly, first-generation immigrants, on average, do not differ in their preferences for 
redistribution from the native-born. However, as is often the case, immigrant origin matters, 
and immigrants from African and South American origins exhibit significantly higher demand 
for redistribution. In contrast, second generation immigrants have a 4.5 percentage points 
higher probability to demand for redistribution than the natives. Also, Figure 8 shows that the 
demand of redistribution of second generation immigrants is significantly higher than that of 
the first-generation immigrants in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in 
Great Britain, France, Austria, and Greece. In what follows, we will explore further to what 
extent this pattern is related to economic integration.    
16 
 
We  end  up  this  section  with  the  overall  perception  of  discrimination  on  different 
grounds. We focus on the question “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a 
group that is discriminated against in this country on grounds: nationality? religion? color and 
race? language? ethnicity? gender?”. The answer takes on the value of 1 for yes and 0 for 
no.In  a  descriptive  way,  Figure  9  shows  the  variation  in  the  grounds  for  perceived 
discrimination  for  immigrants  in  all  destinations  grouped  together.  First-generation 
immigrants feel in general discriminated against more than any other group, and are followed 
by  second-generation  immigrants  and  by  individuals  with  one  parent  born  abroad  in  this 
perception.  The  main  reason  for  perceived  discrimination  is  nationality,  followed  by 
color/race and religion. Strikingly, nationality is at the top of the preoccupation for first-
generation immigrants, while the discrimination for color, religion or ethnic origin is more 
prevalent among second-generation immigrants.  
  For  a  selection  of  countries,  Figure  10  reports  where  immigrants  feel  the  most 
discriminated  against,  all  grounds  for  discrimination  grouped  together.  It  shows  that  the 
feeling of discrimination is spread out in a different way among immigrants depending on the 
destination  country.  Immigrants  from  MENA  feel  the  most  discriminated  in  Spain  (40 
percent), Germany (29  percent), France (26 percent) and Sweden (24 percent). They feel 
much less discriminated in Switzerland (15 percent), and Great Britain (11 percent). Africans 
feel the most discriminated in Germany (40 percent), followed by France (34 percent). All, 
including other-OECD immigrants, report significant degrees of discrimination.     
  Table  4a  reports  the  corresponding  estimates  when  controlling  for  age,  gender, 
destination  country  and  origin  region  fixed  effects.  First  generation  immigrants  have  a  8 
percentage points higher probability of feeling discriminated compared to natives, although 
this effect is weakly significant at the 10 percent level. Table 4b shows that immigrants from 
MENA and Africa display the highest perceived discrimination, which is higher by 22.6 and 
23 percentage points than the perceived discrimination of natives. Looking at the evolution of 
the feeling of discrimination, Table 4a indicates that the gap in perceived discrimination is 
much  more  significant  for  second  generation  immigrants.  The  probability  of  feeling 
discriminated among second generation immigrants is 15 percentage points higher than that of 
the natives, and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This gap is twice as high as 
the one found for first generation immigrants.  From Figure 11, in approximately half of the  
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countries of the sample, second-generation immigrants perceive lower discrimination than 
first-generation  ones,  but  in  half  of  the  sample,  second-generation  immigrants  feel 
significantly more discriminated against as opposed to the first-generation immigrants. This is 
particularly the case in Spain and the Netherlands in the first place, and also in Belgium, 
France,  Ireland,  Norway,  and  Great  Britain.  This  finding  of  increasing  feeling  of 
discrimination, coupled with the finding on widening gaps in trust, once again raises concerns 
about the success of integration processes of immigrants. Since the perceived discrimination 
reflects immigrants’ experiences with the attitudes and behaviors of native-born (potentially 
also of the police, administration, and politicians) in the receiving societies, this finding hints 
at the failure of immigrants’ acceptance. “Culture clash” or “culture club” (Manning and Roy, 
2010) is a two-way process; and pure willingness to assimilate on the part of immigrants is 
not  enough:  it  is  also  the  receiving  societies  that  have  to  accomplish  a  certain  work  of 
accepting and integrating them. 
   
  4.3  Economic integration 
   This section turns to immigrants’ economic assimilation. We estimate the gaps in 
outcomes such as the years of education, probability of having completed tertiary education, 
probability of being unemployed or inactive, probability of being employed in a high- or low- 
skilled job, as well as gaps in incomes.  
  At first sight, from Table 5a, there is no significant overall education gap between 
various types of immigrants and native-born, whether we consider total years of education or 
having  a  tertiary  degree.  However,  large  differences  are  uncovered  for  first-generation 
immigrants by origin (Table 5b). First-generation immigrants from MENA countries have 
lower  years  of  schooling  as  opposed  to  native-born;  while  African,  Asian,  and  South-
American immigrants all have significantly more years of schooling. We find no difference in 
the years of schooling between the native-born and immigrants from the OECD or Eastern 
Europe. However, immigrants from Eastern Europe, together with immigrants from African, 
Asian,  and  South-American  countries,  all  have  a  higher  probability  to  possess  tertiary-
education as compared to native-born. This provides evidence for the positive selection of 
immigrants from these countries, while negative selection of immigrants from MENA region.  
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From  Figure  12  and  attached  footnotes  to  it,  the  gaps  in  years  of  education  of  second-
generation immigrants, as contrasted to those of the first-immigration immigrants, tend to 
close in some destination countries, but to widen in others. In countries such as Finland and 
Norway, a significant regress of immigrant children is observed, as they have significantly 
lower  level  of  schooling.  Even  though  second-generation  immigrants  in  Switzerland  and 
Great Britain still have higher level of schooling than native-born, these levels are actually 
lower than those of the first-generation immigrants to the same countries. The regress is also 
observed in Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden. Only in a few destination countries, such as 
Ireland, Germany, France, and Luxembourg, there is an improvement, albeit in the latter two 
countries, second-generation immigrants are no longer different from the native-born. Further 
research  is  needed  to  understand  whether  this  is  a  purely  composition effect,  or  whether 
indeed this results suggest a failure of integration processes. 
  The next outcome of interest is unemployment and labor market participation. Table 
5b suggests that first-generation immigrants from all but African and OECD countries have 
higher  probability  of  being  unemployed.  Immigrants  from  MENA  display  the  highest 
employment penalty, with a higher probability of 3.5 percentage points of being unemployed 
relative to natives. Also, MENA, African, and Eastern-European immigrants have a slightly 
higher  probability  of  being  inactive  (by  2.2  percentage  point  in  the  case  of  MENA 
immigrants).  
  There is also a cross-country heterogeneity in the evolution of the employment penalty 
across types of immigrants.  Unemployment is significantly higher among second-generation 
immigrants and individuals with one parent born abroad, potentially reflecting, among others, 
the education disadvantage and discrimination.  
  Figure  13  shows  that  this  result,  however,  seems  to  be  mostly  driven  by  France, 
Belgium, and Switzerland, where immigrants from second-generation have particularly higher 
probability  of  being  unemployed,  as  opposed  to  native-born  and  to  first-generation 
immigrants. For these countries, unemployment gaps are large, persisting, and, in the case of 
France, widening.  
For those who are employed, the distribution of jobs across type of skill is of interest. 
We consider gaps in probabilities of being employed in low-skilled, elementary occupations  
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(ISCO classification codes 9), and also the probability of being employed in high-skilled 
occupations (ISCO classification codes 1, 2, and 3). First-generation immigrants regardless of 
their origin have a significantly higher probability of performing worse jobs, regardless of 
their potentially higher level of education. The literature suggests various reasons for this, 
such as the potential mismatch of occupations and qualifications and slow assimilation, or 
different valuation and non-recognitions of diplomas at the destination. Remarkably, however, 
the  biggest  progress  towards  assimilation  along  the  economic  dimension  is  observed  in 
occupation distribution. Figure 14 shows that for all destination countries, second-generation 
immigrants  have  a  significantly  lower  probability  of  performing  an  elementary  job,  as 
opposed to both native-born and first-generation immigrants.  
Finally, we also consider differences in incomes. Unfortunately, the European Social 
Survey does not contain information on earnings, neither on individual income. Thus, we use 
the  household  income  and  divide  it  by  the  number  of  household  members,  but  as  the 
information  on  the  number  of  children  is  not  available  either,  we  are  not  able  to  apply 
equivalence scales and treat each member of the household as an adult. Hence, our measure of 
gaps  in  individual  incomes  is  rather  crude,  and  also  reflects  the  differences  in  the 
compositions of native and immigrant families. Results of the regression analysis show that 
initial individual incomes are much lower for immigrants from almost all origins, but that they 
rise relatively quickly over time. Immigrants with more than twenty years at destination, as 
well as the second-generation immigrants, report higher incomes as compared to native-born. 
Figure 15 shows that second-generation immigrants are doing better than the first-generation 
ones,  with  the  exception  of  Spain,  Belgium,  and  the  Netherlands,  and  in  countries  like 
Switzerland, they outperform native-born.  
To conclude, for  all types of outcomes, we also perform some robustness checks. 
Specifically, we repeat all estimations controlling also for parental education, to account for 
potential social disadvantage. Our results are broadly similar. Two notable differences are in 
socialization gaps, where we no longer find significant differences between first-generation 
immigrants and native-born; and years of schooling of second-generation immigrants, where 
we observe a positive and significant gap, in contrast to the overall negative insignificant 
result when social disadvantage is not accounted for. 
 
5. The interplay between cultural and economic assimilation  
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As we have seen, immigrants’ assimilation is indeed a very complex phenomenon, 
which may take place along some, but not necessarily, all dimensions. This section explores 
further the relationship between cultural, civic, and economic assimilation across European 
countries, assessing whether there is any link between the most salient gaps in the cultural and 
economic  outcomes.  Further,  we  also  investigate  how  the  gaps  in  these  outcomes,  or 
assimilation  process,  correlate  with  opportunities  for  integration  provided  by  destination 
countries. 
To start with, we focus on two cultural outcomes: one shown to be the least rigid 
(language), and one shown to be the most resilient (religiosity), and relate them to economic 
outcomes such as income and occupations. Figure 16 suggests a slight positive relationship 
between the income and language gaps: whereas the language gap is small, so is the income 
gap.  In  contrast,  from  Figure  17,  there  is  a  negative  relation  between  the  probability  of 
occupying a high-skill job and being a more religious person relative to natives. This relation 
is more salient for immigrants in Germany, Netherlands or France.  
The  highest  correlations  are  observed  for  outcomes  such  as  preferences  for 
redistribution and unemployment, but also for preferences for redistribution and religiosity, 
citizenship and civic outcomes; discrimination and trust.  
In general, however, we do not find very strong correlation patterns between various 
types of outcomes (Table 6a). For example, the correlation is next to nil between language 
and citizenship or trust; citizenship and economic outcomes or discrimination. This finding is 
interesting, as it suggests that progress on some dimensions may  compensate the lack of 
progress  on  other  dimensions;  and  also  that  a  big  discrepancy  in  one  dimension  is  not 
necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. Preserving some 
of the behaviors may actually be of help to immigrants to progress on others.    
For  second-generation  immigrants,  the  patterns  of  interplay  between  cultural  and 
economic outcomes are, for the most part, different (Table 6b), and linked both to the fact that 
assimilation is taking place, and also that the composition of two immigrant groups is not the 
same.  For  example,  we  find  a  particularly  high  positive  correlation  between  gaps  in 
citizenship  and  economic  outcomes,  language  and  citizenship,  language  and  perceived 
discrimination, but not between language and economic outcomes. Gaps in discrimination are 
positively correlated with gaps in trust, citizenship, and language. The only notable similar  
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correlation is in gaps in preferences for redistribution and religiosity, which is positive for 
both second- and first-generation immigrants (Figure 18).  
 
6. The interplay between assimilation and policies 
Further, of interest is to relate the progress along these dimensions to opportunities for 
integration, or specific migration policies, provided by destination countries. Yet, relating 
current policies to the gaps in outcomes between native-born and first or second generation 
immigrants is not very informative, as these gaps only reflect the existing differences, but not 
the progress along different dimensions. 
To measure progress, we estimate regressions such as (1), however, we now measure 
the gap between first and second generation immigrants, rather than between immigrants and 
native-born. As already mentioned, in the current setting, we are not able to perfectly control 
for cohort effects; which means that the gaps in outcomes between first and second generation 
immigrants capture both convergence and group composition effect. Nevertheless, they still 
can be informative. For example, finding small outcome gaps between the two groups means 
that there has been either little assimilation, or that both groups have equally hard (easy) time 
changing their behavior at destination regardless of their composition. Finding small gaps is 
thus informative of resilience, or rigidity, of outcomes. At the same time, it may also signify 
that integration has been taking place, in the sense that immigrants of both generations were 
able to preserve their behaviors or preferences. If, however, the gaps in outcomes are large, 
this means that either there has been a lot of assimilation (and assimilation is easy), or that 
one immigrant group has a considerable advantage over the other in analyzed outcomes.  
Our  measures  of  policies  are  from  the  MIPEX  database,  which  assembles  indices 
measuring the friendliness of policies in integrating migrants in European countries. These 
indices cover 140 policy indicators, grouped into 6 main dimensions: labor market access, 
family reunion, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality, and anti-
discrimination.  
We focus on three policy dimensions. The first one is Labor Market access. According 
to the MIPEX documentation, this index measures whether an migrant worker or entrepreneur 
is eligible for the same opportunities as EU nationals to work in most sectors. The index 
ranges from 100 when migrants have exactly the same rights as natives, to 0 when migrants  
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have no rights at all. In the case of 100, or best practice, an immigrant faces full integration 
policies, such as skills recognition, measures to adjust to the professional demands of the 
labour market, access to training, and language improvement. Secure in her employment, an 
immigrant can renew most types of work permits, remain in the country and search for work 
in case of unemployment, be free to change employer and industry or sector, and join a trade 
union.  
The second dimension is anti-discrimination policies. This index also ranges from 0 to 
100,  and  is  a  composite  of  anti-discrimination  laws  that  guarantee  equal  opportunities  in 
economic, social and public life for all members of society, including a migrant and her 
descendents.  In  the  case  of  best  practice,  the  state  helps  to  seek  justice  through  strong 
enforcement mechanisms, such bringing forward a case without fear of reprisals; application 
of wide range of sanctions by courts, such as financial compensation, measures to stop further 
discrimination;  robust legal standing to help all victims on the part of equality bodies. The 
state takes up its responsibility to lead public dialogue and systematically promote equality in 
its functions. 
Lastly, we also look at policies favoring political incorporation of immigrants, such as 
including  them  into  consultative  processes,  giving  voting  rights  and  rights  to  stand  in 
elections, allowing them to join political parties and form associations. 
Table  7  reports  correlation  coefficients  between  integration  policies  across  the 
European countries and gaps in outcomes between first and second generation immigrants. 
Figures 19-21 also relate the gaps in most interesting economic and cultural outcomes, such as 
probability of being unemployed, trust, and discrimination, to these policy measures. There is 
a  high  positive  correlation  between  gaps  in  unemployment  and  policies  favoring  labour 
market access of immigrants. This suggests that either the progress towards employment is 
fast in countries with favorable labour market inclusion of immigrants; or that one immigrant 
group has a considerable advantage over the other in favorable labour market environments; 
or both. Similarly, a positive correlation is observed in gaps in praying and antidiscrimination 
policies:  countries  with  best  antidiscrimination  practices  observe  large  differences  in 
religiosity  among  immigrants.  In  contrast,  better  political  incorporation  of  immigrants  is 
associated with resilience of such features as trust. In other words, trust gap widens from one 
immigrant  generation  to  another  if  immigrants  are  less  likely  to  have  opportunities  for  
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political and civic involvement, potentially reflecting the deception gap observed in earlier 
sections. 
More typically, however, we observe rather disparate, unsystematic, and mostly low, 
correlations  in  policies  and  outcomes.  For  example,  labor  access  policies  have  little 
correlation  with  the  type  of  occupation  or  income  of  immigrants;  while  easiness  of 
naturalization is virtually unrelated to actual citizenship acquisition. As far as it stands, we 
rather find that assimilation processes in economic outcomes are taking place irrespective of 
policies.  In  contrast,  mostly  negative  correlations  are  found  between  better  policies  and 
cultural outcomes, such as trust, preferences for redistribution, and language, potentially also 
suggesting  that  better  policies  actually  allow  for  integration  in  the  sense  of  preserving 
behaviors and preferences pertinent to immigrants.  
This leads us to raising a question of what actually constitutes “good policies”: should 
“good” policies aimed at immigrants’ inclusion change, or, to the contrary, preserve and allow 
for a free exercising, of immigrant outcomes? What should the goals of such policies be? Of 
course,  we  expect  that  policies  such  as  those  specifically  targeting  better  labour  market 
inclusion of immigrants, should indeed favor labour market assimilation of immigrants, in the 
sense of closing up the outcome gaps between immigrants and native-born. On the other hand, 
the impact of other policies, such as antidiscrimination, is considerably more complex, and 
hence  the  assessment  of  their  effectiveness  is  more  complicated.  For  example,  better 
antidiscrimination  policies  improve  economic  outcomes  of  immigrants,  thus  enhancing 
economic assimilation, but they also favor the preservation and free exercising of cultural 
outcomes, which may be taken for the lack of assimilation, but at the same time may indicate 
higher integration. The same policy can thus enhance assimilation on one dimension and 
facilitate integration on another ground; and if this is the case, this can partly explain why we 
observe individual progress on one dimension, but not the other. By the same token, the same 
policy can also be more effective in one sphere of life, and not the other, and hence the 
assessment of its effectiveness should be done among all possible dimensions. 
Clearly,  a  better  understanding  of  the  multifaceted  impact  of  policies,  of  what 
constitutes “good” and “bad” policies, and what kind of policies we may want to have, is 
needed.  Also,  a  more  careful  research  is  needed  to  examine  in  more  detail  the  interplay 
between policies and outcomes, notably, which origin groups are affected the most by specific 




This  paper  has  offered  a  systematic  assessment  of  differences  between  European 
native-born  and  different  types  of  immigrants,  distinguished  by  generation,  duration  of 
residence, and origin, along the most important cultural, civic, and economic dimensions. In 
addition to measuring the differences, we also undertook a first attempt to understand whether 
there is a link between differences in economic and cultural outcomes of the same individuals, 
as well as differences in outcomes and specific migration policies. Throughout the paper, we 
came  across  several  important  findings  that  opened  up  numerous  questions  for  further 
research. Notably, these are the questions of what constitutes “good” integration policies, 
what should be a correct way of assessing policies when they affect numerous life domains, 
and how to design policies that would target and/or spillover to other domains.  
Lastly, the question of a benchmark, with respect to which the assimilation should be 
measured, also came through as being important. While we analyzed both the progress of 
first-generation  immigrants  as  compared  to  native-born,  and  as  compared  to  second-
generation immigrants, the heterogeneity of native-born in Europe remains of a particular 
concern for this type of analysis. For example, Bretons and Corsicans in France may be more 
different than Italians in Switzerland. Thus, further research may also be enriched by stepping 
away  from  the  use  of  an  “average”  native-born  as  a  benchmark  for  immigrants,  and 
encompass a more regional and ethnical perspective.  
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Table 1. Sample Statistics: Focus on Destination Countries; 2002 2009 































AT  6862  75,70  7,30  9,50  7,50  53,30 
BE  7099  77,20  7,50  9,60  5,80  47,90 
CH  7717  60,30  18,40  12,60  8,70  48,00 
DE  11316  81,00  7,30  6,90  4,90  64,70 
DK  6012  85,80  4,70  5,10  4,40  57,20 
ES  7763  90,20  6,60  1,80  1,50  91,20 
FI  7983  95,20  1,40  1,70  1,60  85,20 
FR  7265  73,80  7,90  11,10  7,20  33,30 
GB  8531  79,70  8,20  7,30  4,80  52,40 
GR  4810  81,00  8,00  8,10  2,80  82,60 
IE  5924  86,90  6,00  3,70  3,50  72,50 
LU  3129  39,90  29,40  19,00  11,70  57,80 
NL  6056  82,00  7,30  6,20  4,60  47,30 
NO  6938  86,30  5,50  4,30  3,90  66,50 
PT  7939  92,90  3,90  2,00  1,30  67,00 
SE  7634  75,40  10,00  8,30  6,30  46,20 
 
Table 2. Sample Statistics: Focus on Origin Countries; 2002 2009 
Largest countries of immigrant origin   DE  IT  PT  FR  TR  GB  PL  RU  MA  FI 
Largest countries of immigrant origin, % of 
all first-generation immigrants in the sample  7.7  5.2  5.1  4.6  4.4  3.9  3.4  2.9  2.9  2.3 
Largest countries of non-EU-15 immigrant 
origin  TR  PL  RU  MA  AL  BA  RO  BR  DZ  IN 
Largest countries of non-EU-15 immigrant 
origin in Europe, % of first-generation 













immigrants  with less 








Individuals with 1 
parent born abroad 
Married  0.032  (0.050)  0.079  (0.083)  -0.003  (0.042)  -0.040*  (0.018)  -0.040**  (0.006) 
Divorced  0.018  (0.016)  -0.029  (0.024)  0.059**  (0.018)  -0.013*  (0.006)  0.010*  (0.005) 
Age gap between 
spouses  -0.482*  (0.191)  0.129  (0.290)  -1.059**  (0.332)  -0.058  (0.088)  -0.066  (0.04) 
Language of the country 
spoken at home  -0.347**  (0.049)  -0.535**  (0.042)  -0.172**  (0.058)  -0.120**  (0.011)  -0.046**  (0.004) 
Frequency of praying 
(days a year)  49.079**  (15.206)  33.808*  (18.514)  63.698**  (18.779)  46.796**  (13.313)  16.371**  (5.822) 
Anyone to discuss 
personal matters  0.035  (0.021)  0.042  (0.051)  0.029  (0.019)  -0.014  (0.011)  -0.010*  (0.004) 
Frequency of taking part 
in social activites   -0.181*  (0.067)  -0.180  (0.114)  -0.187*  (0.078)  -0.006  (0.027)  -0.007  (0.023) 
 otes: Each cell contains a coefficient from a separate regression, in which the row heading is the dependent 
variable (the outcome of interest), and the column heading is the independent variable.  Reported coefficients 
represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table  3b.  Average  Gaps  in  Cultural  Outcomes  of   ative born  in  Europe  and  First 
Generation Immigrants, by Origin 
 otes: Each cell contains a coefficient from a separate regression, in which the row heading is the dependent 
variable (the outcome of interest), and the column heading is the independent variable.  Reported coefficients 




VARIABLES  ME A  African  Asian  South American  OECD 
East. European, 
FSU, FY 
Married  0.166**  (0.031)  0.039  (0.024)  0.163**  (0.032)  0.027  (0.022)  0.050*  (0.018)  0.059**  (0.014) 
Divorced  0.022**  (0.005)  0.012  (0.015)  -0.031  (0.016)  0.063**  (0.011)  0.020*  (0.008)  -0.003  (0.011) 
Age gap between 
spouses  -0.195  (0.274)  -0.566  (0.313)  -0.137  (0.346)  -0.021  (0.131)  -0.018  (0.111)  0.226  (0.137) 
Language of the 
country spoken at 
home 
-0.371**  (0.066)  -0.268**  (0.035)  -0.504**  (0.046)  -0.094  (0.058)  -0.174**  (0.019)  -0.331**  (0.036) 
Frequency of praying 
(days a year)  119.450**  (18.612)  170.686**  (12.228)  129.088**  (30.72)  84.404**  (17.568)  23.447*  (8.951)  23.333**  (5.167) 
Anyone to discuss 
personal matters  0.031**  (0.008)  0.040**  (0.009)  0.083**  (0.015)  0.078**  (0.018)  0.013**  (0.004)  0.020**  (0.006) 
Social activites   -0.102*  (0.043)  -0.193**  (0.024)  -0.201**  (0.029)  -0.188**  (0.051)  -0.004  (0.021)  -0.186**  (0.015)  
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immigrants  with less 








Individuals with 1 
parent born 
abroad 
Citizen  -0.425**  (0.061)  -0.619**  (0.085)  -0.241**  (0.059)  -0.106*  (0.050)  -0.043*  (0.018) 
Civic participation  -0.134**  (0.034)  -0.210**  (0.057)  -0.062  (0.048)  -0.023  (0.016)  0.02  (0.017) 
General. trust (1-10)  -0.412**  (0.134)  -0.393  (0.213)  -0.441**  (0.153)  -0.407**  (0.034)  -0.158**  (0.023) 
Trust in police   0.440  (0.364)  0.320  (0.478)  0.566  (0.332)  -0.366**  (0.088)  -0.226**  (0.035) 
Trust in country’s 
parliament  0.652*  (0.263)  0.666  (0.475)  0.616**  (0.210)  -0.118  (0.105)  -0.054  (0.046) 
Trust in politicians  0.233*  (0.089)  0.055  (0.188)  0.369  (0.185)  -0.124**  (0.030)  -0.111**  (0.033) 
Trust in the Eur. 
parliament  0.519**  (0.117)  0.560**  (0.200)  0.454  (0.336)  0.282  (0.155)  0.159  (0.082) 
Satisfaction with 
democracy  0.080*  (0.031)  0.072*  (0.032)  0.083*  (0.034)  0.022  (0.026)  -0.005  (0.013) 
Preferences for 
redistribution  -0.013  (0.044)  -0.015  (0.066)  -0.010  (0.053)  0.045**  (0.011)  0.008  (0.006) 
Perceived 
discrimination  0.080*  (0.031)  0.072*  (0.032)  0.083*  (0.034)  0.150**  (0.025)  0.070**  (0.015) 
 otes: Each cell contains a coefficient from a separate regression, in which the row heading is the dependent 
variable (the outcome of interest), and the column heading is the independent variable.  Reported coefficients 
represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
Table  4b.  Average  Gaps  in  Civic  Outcomes  of   ative born  in  Europe  and  First 
Generation Immigrants, by Origin 
 otes: Each cell contains a coefficient from a separate regression, in which the row heading is the dependent 
variable (the outcome of interest), and the column heading is the independent variable.  Reported coefficients 
represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
VARIABLES  ME A  African  Asian  South American  OECD 
East. European, 
FSU, FY 
Citizen  -0.481**  (0.071)  -0.392**  (0.053)  -0.329**  (0.072)  -0.562**  (0.139)  -0.579**  (0.037)  -0.358**  (0.095) 
Civic 
participation  -0.132**  (0.042)  -0.096**  (0.028)  -0.217**  (0.014)  -0.130**  (0.028)  -0.047**  (0.013)  -0.197**  (0.023) 
Gen. trust (1-10)  -0.311  (0.176)  -0.354**  (0.068)  -0.072  (0.072)  -0.195  (0.097)  -0.052  (0.058)  0.056  (0.062) 
Trust in police   0.131  (0.092)  0.112  (0.128)  0.394*  (0.160)  0.022  (0.056)  0.130  (0.075)  0.170  (0.102) 
Trust in countrs. 
Parliament  0.399**  (0.065)  0.986**  (0.268)  1.219**  (0.362)  0.579**  (0.052)  0.103  (0.088)  0.472**  (0.072) 
Trust in 
politicians  0.359**  (0.078)  0.644**  (0.089)  0.891**  (0.173)  0.528**  (0.077)  -0.046  (0.076)  0.379**  (0.093) 
Trust in the Eur. 
Parliament  0.612**  (0.141)  1.035**  (0.121)  1.190**  (0.246)  0.617**  (0.079)  0.456**  (0.070)  0.591**  (0.116) 
Satisfaction with 
democracy  0.120**  (0.022)  0.145**  (0.012)  0.209**  (0.028)  0.077**  (0.018)  0.064**  (0.008)  0.089**  (0.015) 
Preferences for 
redistribution  0.022  (0.011)  0.062**  (0.022)  -0.005  (0.014)  0.045*  (0.019)  -0.011  (0.011)  -0.011  (0.015) 
Perceived 
discrimination  0.226**  (0.029)  0.230**  (0.031)  0.107**  (0.019)  0.164**  (0.017)  0.018  (0.016)  0.139**  (0.023)  
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immigrants  with less 










1 parent born 
abroad 
Years of education  -0.514  (0.980)  -0.339  (0.514)  -0.980  (0.339)  -0.24  (0.254)  0.142  (0.119) 
Tertiary education  -0.006  (0.036)  -0.044  (0.093)  0.014  (0.584)  -0.029  (0.019)  0.012  (0.011) 
Unemployed  0.016  (0.021)  0.023  (0.034)  0.010  (0.035)  0.030**  (0.006)  0.019**  (0.003) 
Inactive  0.051  (0.025)  0.088*  (0.040)  0.018  (0.018)  0.006  (0.006)  0.006  (0.004) 
Occupation: high 
skilled  -0.094**  (0.032)  -0.082  (0.056)  -0.104*  (0.046)  -0.01  (0.024)  0.015  (0.012) 
Occupation: low 
skilled  0.047*  (0.017)  -0.021  (0.028)  0.107**  (0.037)  0.001  (0.014)  0.001  (0.008) 
Individual income 
(log)  -0.260**  (0.025)  -0.200**  (0.044)  0.200**  (0.043)  0.122**  (0.024)  0.217**  (0.024) 
 otes: To calculate the gaps in the years of education and in possession of tertiary education, we restrict the 
sample to individuals of 30 years and more. Each cell contains a coefficient from a separate regression, in which 
the row heading is the dependent variable (the outcome of interest), and the column heading is the independent 
variable.  Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 5b. Gaps in Economic Outcomes of  ative born in Europe and First Generation 
Immigrants, by Origin 
 otes: To calculate the gaps in the years of education and in possession of tertiary education, we restrict the 
sample to individuals of 30 years and more. Each cell contains a coefficient from a separate regression, in which 
the row heading is the dependent variable (the outcome of interest), and the column heading is the independent 
variable.  Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 




education  -1.443*  (0.859)  1.437*  (0.711)  0.691**  (0.319)  1.723**  (0.473)  0.399  (0.671)  -0.116  (0.397) 
Tertiary 
education  -0.084*  (0.04-)  0.103*  (0.049)  0.038**  (0.013)  0.095**  (0.026)  0.072  (0.038)  0.211*  (0.009) 
Unemployed  0.035**  (0.011)  0.029  (0.018)  0.034**  (0.005)  0.034**  (0.009)  0.009  (0.007)  0.044**  (0.008) 
Inactive  0.022**  (0.007)  0.011**  (0.003)  0.001  (0.004)  0.012  (0.011)  0.002  (0.002)  0.007**  (0.002) 
Occupation: high 
skilled  -0.155**  (0.041)  -0.028  (0.051)  -0.058*  (0.024)  -0.088**  (0.021)  0.017  (0.034)  -0.120**  (0.017) 
Occupation: low 
skilled  0.063**  (0.018)  0.054*  (0.021)  0.005  (0.023)  0.123**  (0.043)  0.018**  (0.005)  0.077**  (0.011) 
Individual 
income (log)  -0.509**  (0.078)  -0.243*  (0.096)  -0.395**  (0.033)  -0.114  (0.053)  0.047  (0.070)  -0.293**  (0.032)  
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Table  6a.  Correlations  between  Differences  in  Outcomes  between  First  Generation 
Immigrants and  ative born; Selected Outcomes 
 









                         
Citizenship  1.00                       
Language  0.10  1.00                     
Unemployed  0.01  0.38  1.00                   
Education  0.25  -0.02  -0.49  1.00                 
Low skilled  -0.65  -0.13  -0.18  -0.39  1.00               
Individual income  0.48  0.25  0.11  -0.11  -0.34  1.00             
Religiosity  0.10  0.27  -0.03  -0.27  -0.04  0.43  1.00           
Discrimination  -0.01  0.23  -0.15  0.14  0.38  -0.26  -0.44  1.00         
Pref. for redist.  -0.17  0.30  0.42  -0.52  0.14  0.23  0.28  0.07  1.00       
Generaliz.trust  -0.45  -0.13  -0.65  0.06  0.70  -0.20  -0.02  0.56  -0.03  1.00     
Trust in police  -0.50  -0.04  -0.37  -0.25  0.62  0.26  0.49  -0.07  0.30  0.63  1.00   
Trust in politicians  -0.43  -0.12  -0.53  0.05  0.57  0.18  0.31  0.05  0.13  0.74  0.90  1.00 
 
 
Table 6b. Correlations between Differences in Outcomes between Second Generation 
Immigrants and  ative born; Selected Outcomes 









                         
Citizenship  1.00                       
Language  0.63  1.00                     
Unemployed  -0.11  0.02  1.00                   
Education  -0.05  0.07  0.25  1.00                 
Low skilled  -0.11  0.24  -0.10  0.09  1.00               
Individual income  0.12  -0.12  0.41  0.09  -0.28  1.00             
Religiosity  -0.38  0.08  0.40  0.52  0.50  0.33  1.00           
Discrimination  0.54  0.11  -0.30  -0.33  -0.31  0.04  -0.62  1.00         
Pref. for redist.  -0.05  -0.09  0.16  0.39  0.44  0.43  0.56  -0.03  1.00       
Generaliz.trust  0.18  0.24  0.10  0.28  0.22  -0.54  -0.08  -0.14  0.02  1.00     
Trust in police  -0.16  0.01  0.31  0.51  0.60  -0.07  0.56  -0.54  0.50  0.40  1.00   






Table 7. Correlations between Specific Migration Policies and Differences in Outcomes 











         
Citizenship  -0.332  -0.037  0.205  -0.025 
Unemployed  0.378  0.019  0.238  -0.094 
Occupation: low skilled  0.049  -0.529  -0.266  -0.458 
Civic Participation  0.041  0.205  0.255  0.163 
GeneralizedTrust  -0.112  0.140  -0.231  -0.034 
Perceived Discrimination  -0.348  -0.042  -0.243  -0.203 
Language  0.034  -0.325  0.085  -0.133 
Occupation: high skilled  0.386  0.156  0.405  0.173 
Religiosity  0.224  0.383  0.230  0.561 
Pref. for redistribution  -0.182  -0.566  -0.137  -0.321 




 Figure 1. Gaps in Speaking the Destination Country’s Language at Home among First  
and Second Generation Immigrants as Opposed to  ative Born 
 
 
Figure 2. Gaps in the Probability of Speaking the Language (1
st and 2
nd generation) as 
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Figure 3. Gaps in Religiosity among First  and Second Generation Immigrants as 
Opposed to  ative Born 
 
Figure 4. Gaps in  aturalization among First  and Second Generation Immigrants as 
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Figure 5.  aturalization of First and Second Generation Immigrants by Destination 
 
Figure 6. Gaps in Generalized Trust among First  and Second Generation Immigrants 
as Opposed to  ative Born 
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Figure 7. Gaps in Trust in the Police among First  and Second Generation Immigrants 
as Opposed to  ative Born 
 
 
Figure 8. Gaps in Preferences for Redistribution among First  and Second Generation 
Immigrants as Opposed to  ative Born 
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Figure 9. The Dimensions of Discrimination 
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Figure 11. Gaps in Perceived Discrimination First  and Second Generation Immigrants 
as Opposed to  ative Born 
 
Figure 12. Gaps in Years of Education among First  and Second Generation Immigrants 
as Opposed to  ative Born 
 
 ote: Regression results suggest the following statistically significant gaps: 
  AT  BE  CH  DE  DK  ES  FR  FI  GB  GR  IE  LU  NL  NO  PT  SE 
First generation   0.00  -0.50  0.61  -1.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.95  1.15  0.00  1.24  -1.48  0.00  1.03  1.39  0.85 
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Figure 13. Gaps in Unemployment among First  and Second Generation Immigrants as 
Opposed to  ative Born 
 
Note: Regression results suggest the following statistically significant gaps: 
  AT  BE  CH  DE  DK  ES  FR  GB  GR  IE  LU  NL  NO  PT  SE 
First generation   0.020  0.034  0.024  0.044  0.063  0.041  0.021  0.000  0.000  0.055  0.028  0.039  0.000  0.000  0.000 


































































Gaps in Unemployment 
40 
 
Figure 14. Gaps in Probability of Occupying a Low Skilled Job as Opposed to  ative 
Born 
 
Note: Regression results suggest the following statistically significant gaps: 
  AT  BE  CH  DE  DK  ES  FR  GB  GR  IE  LU  NL  NO  PT  SE 
First generation   0.05  0.00  0.07  0.06  0.00  0.14  0.05  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Figure 15. Gaps in (logarithm of) Individual Income as Opposed to  ative Born 
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Figure 19. Gaps in Unemployment between First  and Second Generation Immigrants, 
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Figure 20. Gaps in Praying between First  and Second Generation Immigrants, and 
Antidiscrimination  
 
Note: Correlation is 0.573 if Greece and Norway are excluded 
Figure 21. Gaps in Trust between First  and Second Generation Immigrants, and 
Political Inclusion Policies 
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Table A1. Descriptive Statistics by Immigrant Status (Means)    Appendix I 
  First 
generation 
Immigrants, 











with 1 parent 
born abroad 
 ative born 
Socio Economic Indicators: 
Years of education  12.74  11.82  12.63  12.85  12.07 
Tertiary education  0.26  0.22  0.20  0.24  0.20 
Unemployed  0.09  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.04 
Inactive  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02 
Occupation: high skilled  0.22  0.31  0.30  0.34  0.30 
Occupation: low skilled  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.08  0.09 
Cultural Indicators: 
Married  0.57  0.63  0.42  0.44  0.55 
Divorced  0.08  0.10  0.06  0.08  0.07 
Age gap between spouses  2.73  2.38  2.23  2.29  2.28 
Partner economically active  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Speaking an official 
language of a country as 
first language at home  0.61  0.80  0.86  0.93  0.98 
Belonging to the main 
religion of the country  0.29  0.33  0.32  0.34  0.49 
Frequency of praying (days 
a year)  129.00  135.57  97.90  74.88  82.57 
Perceived discrimination  0.22  0.15  0.22  0.13  0.05 
Frequency of socialization 
(on the scale from 1 to 7)  5.01  4.88  5.21  5.17  4.96 
Anyone to discuss intimate 
matters with   0.901  0.871  0.916  0.917  0.914 
Generalized trust (1-10)  4.99  4.74  4.42  4.72  4.82 
Trust in police   6.51  6.20  5.69  5.86  6.02 
Trust in country’s 
parliament  5.32  4.77  4.29  4.38  4.37 
Trust in legislation  5.95  5.30  5.01  5.07  5.00 
Trust in politicians  4.19  3.69  3.41  3.43  3.42 
Trust in the European 
parliament  5.29  4.53  4.54  4.46  4.43 
Trust in the United Nations  5.42  5.02  4.95  5.08  5.18 
Civic Indicators: 
Citizen  0.42  0.69  0.89  0.95  1.00 
Civic participation  0.33  0.47  0.50  0.53  0.46 
Satisfaction with 
democracy  0.82  0.71  0.66  0.64  0.65 
Preferences: 
In favor of redistribution  0.65  0.70  0.72  0.68  0.69 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations based on the ESS.  





Appendix II. List of Countries in Immigrants’ Origin Sub groups:  
 
MENA : 
Alger, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Yemen, Arab Emirates 
 
East European, FSU, FY: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and 




Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, Gambia, Kenya, Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Asian: 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Laos, 




Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Surinam, El Salvador, 




Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Island, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Japan, Luxembourg, the US, Sweden 
 
 
 